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In a period of heightened concern about fiscal consolidation in the euro area, a politically 
expedient way of controlling the public budget is to cut public investment. A critical 
question, however, is whether or not political expediency comes at a cost, in terms of both 
long-term economic performance and future budgetary contention efforts. First, common 
wisdom suggests that public investments have positive effects on economic performance 
although the empirical evidence is less clear. Second, it is conceivable that public investment 
has such strong effects on output that over time it generates enough additional tax revenues 
to pay for itself. Obviously, it is equally plausible that the effects on output although positive 
are not strong enough for the public investment to pay for itself.   
In this paper, we investigate these issues empirically for the first twelve countries in the 
euro area using a vector auto-regressive approach. We conclude that the euro countries can 
be gathered in four groups according to the nature of the economic and budgetary impact of 
public investment. The first group includes Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Netherlands, 
where the economic effects are either negative or positive but very small and, therefore, cuts 
will be harmless for the economy and effective from a budgetary perspective. The second 
group includes Finland, Portugal, and Spain, where public investment does not pay for itself 
and, therefore, cuts are an effective tool of budgetary consolidation although they are 
harmful for the economy. The third group includes France, Greece, and Ireland where public 
investment just pays for itself and therefore cuts are not an effective way of achieving 
long-term budgetary consolidation and are harmful for the economy. Finally, the fourth 
group includes Germany and Italy, where public investment more than pays for itself and, 
therefore, cuts are not only harmful for the economy but also counterproductive from a 
budgetary perspective. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Fiscal consolidation has been one of the most difficult economic challenges for the 
countries in the euro area. For these countries, market pressures, international 
commitments and ultimately the threat of financial sanctions in the context of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, place serious constraints on the 
public budget and on the ability of the domestic authorities to run public deficits. Indeed, 
under the Stability and Growth Pact these countries are obligated to maintain budgetary 
positions close to balance and the so-called Excessive Deficit Procedures can be 
launched if the deficit exceeds 3% of the GDP or the public debt exceeds 60% of the 
GDP
1. Naturally, then, the existence and persistence of substantial public deficits and 
large public debts, often well in excess of these reference values, have become in recent 
years a matter of great concern for several countries. France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
and Portugal, are currently the subject of ongoing Excessive Deficit Procedures while 
Netherlands is just recovering from a similar situation. 
One of the policy questions raised by the fiscal rules of the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact was the extent to which public investment would be reduced 
due to the fact that governments would have to finance the bulk of their capital 
expenditures out of current tax revenues. Typically, under a golden rule type of 
argument, while current government spending should be financed by taxation, capital 
spending should be financed with debt. Under close to balanced budget rules, however, 
governments are very limited in their ability to use debt-financing as a way of smoothing 
the burden of public investments over time. Evidence for the United States
2 suggests 
that states that maintain separate capital and current expenditure budgets spend more on 
capital than states using unified budgets and that states that borrow to finance investment 
tend to have a higher level of investment than states that do not.   
The issue of how public investment may be affected by these fiscal rules is 
exacerbated under the current budgetary situation in countries with high deficit and/or 
high public debt to GDP ratios. A casual look at the data
3  suggests that although public 
investment has been and is projected to be relatively constant in the euro area, there has 
been in recent years or it is projected for the near future a steady decline in public 
investment in the cases of Germany, Greece, and Portugal, countries currently facing 
serious budgetary challenges as well as Netherlands, a country that is just recovering 
from its own budgetary problems.   
There is no escaping the fact that for most countries the bulk of public spending is in 
the form of compensation of employees and social benefits and transfers, both difficult 
 
1 See, for example, Buti, Franco, and Ongena (1998) and Morris, Ongena, and Schuknecht (2006) for 
detailed discussion of these institutional issues. 
2 See, for example, Poterba (1995). 
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to control, and that public opinion is steadfast against tax hikes. Faced with these 
budgetary pressures and political constraints, the margin of maneuver is very limited and 
cuts in public investment have often been regarded, at least implicitly, as the easy way 
out. Indeed, unlike the effects of reductions in other types of spending or of tax hikes, 
the effects of cuts in public investment take some time to reverberate through the 
economy. Therefore, they are particularly expedient from a political perspective. A 
critical question, however, is whether or not political expediency comes at a cost, first in 
terms of long-term economic performance and second in terms of future budgetary 
consolidation  efforts.   
The first possible cost of cuts in public investment is in the form of losses in 
economic performance. Indeed, it is a common view that public investment tends to 
improve long-term economic performance. At an empirical level, however, evidence as 
to the magnitude and even the sign of such effects is less clear
4. Furthermore, in more 
developed countries where the role of the private sector in the provision of 
infrastructures is expected to increase and where there may exist a trend toward smaller 
government, the link between public investment and long-term economic performance is 
less clear even at the conceptual level. At any rate, whether or not reductions in public 
investment will lead to undesirable effects in terms of long-term economic performance 
is a matter to be decided empirically.     
The second possible cost of cuts in public investment is in the form of losses of 
future tax revenues. Indeed, to the extent that public investment increases output in the 
long-term, it also expands the tax base and, therefore, increases tax revenues. It is 
conceivable that public investment has such strong effects on output, that over time it 
generates enough additional tax revenues to pay for itself, a possibility that underlies 
golden rule arguments. It is equally plausible that the effects on output, although positive, 
are not strong enough for the public investment to pay for itself. In the first case, cuts in 
public investment hurt long-term economic performance and make the future budgetary 
situation worse. In the second case, cuts in public investment hurt long-term economic 
performance without hurting the future budgetary situation.   
In this paper, we address these issues from an empirical perspective in the context of 
the twelve euro area countries. Our objective is to determine empirically the long-term 
economic effect of public investment in these countries and, if these effects are positive, 
to what extent they are large enough for public investment to pay for itself. Accordingly, 
countries can fall in one of four groups: countries for which public investment cuts are 
harmless; countries for which they hurt the economy without hurting future budgetary 
consolidation efforts; countries for which they hurt the economy but they just pay for 
themselves and are, therefore, unnecessary from a budgetary perspective; and finally, 
countries for which cuts in public investment may turn out to be not only harmful for the 
economy but also counter-productive in the long-term from a budgetary perspective. To 
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identify which scenario applies in each country is fundamental to assess the impact, and 
ultimately the wisdom, of any cuts in public investment.   
Our empirical analysis follows a vector auto-regressive/error correction mechanism 
approach (VAR/ECM), which relates output, employment, private investment, and 
public investment. This approach highlights the dynamic feedbacks among the different 
variables and captures both direct and indirect channels (through its effects on 
employment and private investment) through which public investment affects output. 
The specifics of the identification and measurement of the effects of public investment 
follow the approach developed by Pereira (2000, 2001) in the context of the analysis of 
the effects of public investment in infrastructure in the US and was inspired by the 
literature on the effects of monetary policies. 
From a methodological perspective, this paper is also akin to the growing body of 
research attempting to estimate the macroeconomic effects of distinct fiscal policies 
through the use of vector autoregressive models (VAR), models routinely used to 
evaluate the effects of monetary policy
5. Overall, VAR models have clearly become the 
instrument of choice in the debate on the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy as well 
as the debate on the effect of infrastructures and, methodologically, this paper comes in 
the confluence of these two bodies of literature. 
 
 
2.    DATA AND PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
2.1.  Data  
 
In this paper we consider the twelve countries in euro area: Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
and Spain. The variables considered are output (Y), employment (L), private gross fixed 
capital formation or private investment (Ip) and gross fixed capital formation of the 
government or public investment (Ig). All variables are measured in millions of constant 
2000 euros except for employment, which is measured in thousand of employees.   
We use annual data for the period 1980-2003. With very few exceptions, the data 
was obtained from the National Accounts as published by the OECD (2005) and 
available at http://www.oecd.org/topicstatsportal/0,2647,en_2825_495684_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
In the case of employment and/or public investment for Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
and Spain, the OECD dataset was complemented for the earlier years with data from the 





5 See Kamps (2005) for a discussion of estimates of the effects of public investment and Perotti (2004) for 
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Table 1.    Public Investment as a percentage of the GDP (%) 
 1980-84  1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03  1980-2003 
Austria  3.9 3.3 3.1 2.3 1.3  2.8 
Belgium  4.0 2.4 1.8 1.7 1.7  2.4 
Finland  3.7 3.6 3.4 2.9 2.8  3.3 
France  3.2 3.3 3.5 3.0 3.0  3.2 
Greece  2.7 3.1 3.0 3.4 3.9  3.2 
Germany  3.1 2.6 2.6 2.0 1.7  2.4 
Ireland  4.8 2.7 2.2 2.6 3.9  3.2 
Italy  3.4 3.4 2.9 2.3 2.3  2.9 
Luxembourg  5.5 4.1 4.8 4.5 4.6  4.7 
Netherlands  3.4 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.3  3.1 
Portugal  4.2 3.3 3.7 4.1 3.7  3.8 
Spain  2.6 3.7 4.4 3.3 3.5  3.5 
 
 
Some basic details of the public investment data are presented in Table 1. Over the 
sample period, public investment ranges from 2.4% of the GDP for Belgium and 
Germany to 4.7% in Luxembourg with most countries around the 3.0% of the GDP. 
Moreover, in the last decade, on average, Greece, Ireland, and Netherlands seem to have 
increased their efforts in the are of public investment while the public investment to 
GDP ratios have declined noticeably in Austria, Germany, and Portugal. 
The possibility of structural breaks was incorporated in to the statistical procedures 
for different countries. In the case of Germany, in order to accommodate the 
reunification process we considered a dummy variable centered around 1991. In addition, 
dummies relating to the date of joining the EU were considered for Portugal and Spain, 
centered around 1986, and for Austria and Finland, centered around 1995. In no case, 
however, were these dummies statistically significant according to either simple 
significance tests or BIC tests in the case of the VAR specifications. Accordingly, we 
concluded that in our framework of analyzes of fiscal policies, joining the EU did not 
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Table 2.    Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
















Austria  y  1 constant  and  trend -2.1640 Belgium y  0 constant  and  trend  -3.0196 
l  2 constant  and  trend -2.9236  l  1 constant  and  trend  -2.6827 
ip  0 constant  and  trend -2.7722  ip  1 constant    -2.2208 
ig  0 none  -1.6057  ig  0 constant    -2.3161 
Δy 0  constant  -4.0050** Δy 0  constant  -3.7955** 
Δl 1  constant -3.4440* Δl 0  constant    -3.6261* 
Δip 0  constant  -4.0258** Δip 0  constant   -4.4391** 
Δig 0  none  -4.1252** Δig 0  none  -3.6173** 
Finland  y  1 constant  and  trend -3.1520  France y  1 constant  and  trend  -2.7460 
l  1 constant  and  trend -3.5287  l  1 constant  and  trend  -2.9794 
ip  0 constant    -1.3986  ip  1 constant  and  trend  -3.4760 
ig  0 constant    -1.8838  ig  0 none  1.8996 
Δy 1  none  -2.0019* Δy 0  constant  -3.1012* 
Δl 1  none  -2.8719** Δl 1  none  -2.1511* 
Δip 1  none  -2.9491** Δip 1  none  -2.0318* 
Δig 0  none  -4.9669** Δig 0  none  -3.4784** 
Germany  y  1 constant  and  trend -1.6900  Greece y  0 constant    3.4604 
l  0 constant  and  trend -1.7196  l  0 constant  and  trend  -3.6982 
ip  1 constant  and  trend -1.7890  ip  0 constant  and  trend  -1.2990 
ig  1 constant  and  trend -1.8585  ig  0 constant  and  trend  -2.4768 
Δy 1  constant  -2.9779* Δy 0  constant  and  trend  -4.3415* 
Δl 0  none  -3.9041** Δl 0  constant -7.7649** 
Δip 0  none  -2.8458** Δip 0  constant  and  trend  -5.5877** 
Δig 0  none  -2.4374* Δig 0  none  -4.8263** 
Ireland  y  0 constant  and  trend -2.0654  Italy  y  1 constant  and  trend  -1.9987 
l  1 constant  and  trend -1.9148  l  1 constant  and  trend  -2.9500 
ip  1 constant  and  trend -2.9905  ip  1 constant  and  trend  -3.1228 
ig  1 constant  and  trend -2.0603  ig  0 constant    -2.5319 
Δy 0  constant    -3.2205* Δy 0  constant  -3.5779* 
Δl 0  none  -2.3899* Δl 0  none  -2.6160* 
Δip 0  none  -2.4608* Δip 0  none  -2.9547** 
Δig 1  constant  and  trend -4.0548* Δig 0  none  -5.5951** 
Luxem- 
bourg 
y  1 constant  and  trend -2.2925 Nether- 
lands
y  1 constant  and  trend  -3.0786 
l  1 constant  and  trend -2.6252  l  1 constant    -1.8407 
ip  0 constant  and  trend -2.4366  ip  1 constant  and  trend  -2.5549 
ig  1 constant  and  trend -2.9734  ig  0 constant  and  trend  -2.3836 
Δy 0  constant    -3.7514* Δy 1  constant  -3.9142** 
Δl 0  constant -3.4400* Δl 1  constant    -6.3969** 
Δip 0  constant  -4.5147** Δip 0  none  -2.5561* 
Δig 0  none  -2.8380** Δig 0  none  -3.3312** PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE  7
Portugal  y  1 constant  and  trend -3.5977  Spain y  1 constant  and  trend  -3.5682 
l  0 constant  and  trend -2.5622  l  1 constant  and  trend  -3.5729 
ip  1 constant  and  trend -3.5328  ip  1 constant  and  trend  -3.6074 
ig  0 constant  and  trend -1.8767  ig  0 constant    -2.9204 
Δy 1  none  -1.9839* Δy 0  constant  -3.4803* 
Δl 0  none  -3.6933** Δl 1  none  -2.0866* 
Δip 0  none  -2.9547** Δip 1  none  -2.0420* 
Δig 0  none  -2.6694** Δig 0  none  -3.4578** 
Note: * significant at 5% level and ** significant at 1% level. 
 
 
2.2.    Univariate and Cointegration Analysis 
 
We use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) t-test to test the null hypothesis of a 
unit root and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to determine the optimal number 
of lags and we include deterministic components when statistically significant. Test 
results are reported in Table 2. For all of the variables in log-levels the t-statistics are 
greater than the critical values, either at 5% or at 1% significance levels, and we find that, 
therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. When applied to the first 
differences of the log-levels, i.e., to the growth rates of the original variables, however, 
the ADF tests allow us to reject the null hypothesis of unit roots for all variables, since 
all the t-statistics are lower than the 5% critical values. Therefore, our conclusion is that 
all variables are stationary in first differences. 
Having established that all variables are integrated of order one, we now test for 
cointegration. We use the Engle-Granger procedure which is less vulnerable than the 
Johansen procedure to the small sample bias toward finding cointegration when it does 
not exist
6. Following the standard Engle-Granger procedure, we perform four tests, each 
one with a different endogenous variable. This is because it is possible that one of the 
variables enters the cointegrating relationship with a statistically insignificant coefficient. 
We apply the ADF t-test to the residuals of the different regressions. The optimal lag 
structure is chosen using the BIC and we include deterministic components when 
statistically significant. Test results are reported in Table 3. We find that for eight of the 
twelve countries the test statistics are higher than the 5% critical values, and therefore, in 
no case can we reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals of the estimated 
equations. For the remaining four countries the same is true for three of the four tests. 
Accordingly, we do not find evidence of cointegration among the variables for any of 
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Table 3.  Engle-Granger  Cointegration  Tests 
















Austria  y  0 none  -5.0476** Belgium y  0 none -1.7831 
l  0 none  -3.0438  l  1 constant and trend  -2.1700 
ip  0 none  -2.9241  ip  1 none -2.4532 
ig  0 none  -0.9016  ig  0 none -3.2693 
Finland  y  0 none  -1.9655  France y  1 none -3.8643* 
l  1 none  -2.3151  l  1 none -2.8686 
ip  0 none  -2.2358  ip  1 none -3.3047 
ig  0 none  -3.6338  ig  0 none -1.9413 
Germany  y  1 none  -2.1962  Greece y  1 none -1.8327 
l  0 none  -2.8733  l  1 none -1.6837 
ip  0 none  -2.7409  ip  0 none -3.2850 
ig  1  constant and trend -1.8089  ig  1 none -2.1993 
Ireland  y  1 none  -3.7552* Italy  y  0 none -3.5456 
l  1  constant and trend -2.3600  l  1 none -3.0700 
ip  1  constant and trend -3.9666  ip  1 none -2.6647 
ig  1 none  -2.9720  ig  0 none -3.5930 
Luxem- 
bourg 
y  0 none  -3.1033  Nether- 
lands
y  1 constant and trend  -6.7414** 
l  0 none  -2.7550  l  1 none -2.4545 
ip  0 none  -2.8259  ip  1 none -3.6703 
ig  0 none  -2.0626  ig  0 constant and trend  -1.7230 
Portugal  y  0 none  -2.4692  Spain y  1 none -3.6792 
l  0 none  -2.6020  l  1 none -3.2559 
ip  0 none  -2.5581  ip  1 none -2.7651 
ig  0 none  -2.5932  ig  0 none -2.2444 
Note: *significant at 5% level and ** significant at 1% level. 
 
 
2.3.  VAR  Specification  and  Estimation 
 
We have determined that all of the variables in log-levels are stationary in first 
differences and that they are not cointegrated. Accordingly, we follow the standard 
procedure in the literature and estimate VAR models using growth rates of the original 
variables, i.e., of output, employment, private investment, and public investment.     
The model specifications are determined using the BIC. The test results, which are 
reported in Table 4, suggest that the best specification, for France, Ireland, and Spain is a 
VAR model of first order with a constant term and trend, while for Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, and Netherlands only a constant is selected. 
Finally, for Italy, and Portugal a VAR model of first order without deterministic terms is 
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Table 4.    BIC Tests for VAR Specification 
  none  constant  constant and trend 
Austria -28.9738  -29.4947  -29.3539 
Belgium -28.0111  -28.3200  -28.0939 
Finland -26.2306  -27.1945  -26.8386 
France -31.8392  -31.9318  -32.4584 
Germany -26.2893  -26.7745  -26.7496 
Greece -25.5974  -25.6692  -25.4467 
Ireland -25.3622  -25.7527  -26.1137 
Italy -29.6693  -29.4912  -29.5403 
Luxembourg -26.1629  -26.1713  -25.9908 
Netherlands -30.3700  -30.3921  -30.1413 
Portugal -26.4936  -26.2872  -26.2368 
Spain -28.4013  -28.9699  -29.1168 
 
 
Details of the VAR estimates are omitted here for the sake of brevity but are readily 
available upon request. The only point worth mentioning here is that the matrices of 
contemporaneous correlations among the estimated residuals tend to show a block 
diagonal pattern with low contemporaneous correlation between innovations in public 
investment and the remaining variables. To illustrate the point, only 6 of the 36 
estimated contemporaneous correlations between innovations in public investment and 
private variables exceed 0.40 in absolute value. They occur in the cases of Germany, 
Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Portugal. In turn, 26 of the 36 contemporaneous 
correlations among private variables exceed 0.40 in absolute value.  This pattern is 
consistent with evidence in the literature
7 and suggests that innovations in public 
investment and private sector variables are for most part statistically uncorrelated. This 
is important because it implies the orthogonalization strategies to be discussed below 




3.    ON THE IDENTIFICATION AND MEASUREMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF 
INNOVATIONS 
 
3.1.  Identifying  Innovations  in  the Public Investment Variables 
 
In order to determine the effects of public investment we use the impulse-response 
functions associated with the estimated VAR models. In determining these effects it is 
important to consider innovations in public investment that are not contemporaneously 
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correlated to shocks in the other variables. In dealing with this issue, we draw from the 
approach in the monetary policy literature
8. This approach was adapted in Pereira (2000, 
2001) to the analysis of public investment in infrastructures in the United States. 
Ideally, the identification of exogenous shocks to public investment would result 
from knowing what fraction of the government appropriations is due to purely 
non-economic reasons. The econometric counterpart to this idea is to imagine a policy 
function, which relates the rate of growth of public investment to the relevant 
information set. In our case, the relevant information set could include the past and 
current observations of the growth rates of the private sector variables. The residuals 
from this policy function reflect the unexpected component to the evolution of public 
investment and are uncorrelated with other innovations. 
In the central case, we assume that the relevant information set for the public sector 
includes past but not current values of the other variables. This is equivalent, in the 
context of the standard Choleski decomposition, to assuming that innovations in public 
investment lead innovations in the other variables. This means that we allow innovations 
in public investment to affect the other variables contemporaneously, but not the reverse. 
We have two reasons for making this our central case. First, it is reasonable to assume 
that the private sector reacts within a year to innovations in public investment decisions. 
Second, it also seems reasonable to assume that the public sector is unable to adjust 
public investment decisions to innovations in the private variables within a year. This is 
due to the time lags involved in information gathering and decision-making. Despite the 
imminent plausibility of this central case scenario, when reporting the effects of public 
investment we consider all twenty-four possible orderings of the variables within the 
context of the Choleski decomposition and present the corresponding range of results in 
Table 6.   
The policy functions are reported in Table 5. Our empirical results suggest that in the 
cases of Austria, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain public investment is statistically 
exogenous at the 10% level, i.e., changes in public investment do not respond to lagged 
changes in private-sector variables. This is not the case, however, for the remaining 
countries. In fact, in Finland, Greece, and Luxembourg, public investment responds to 
changes in employment while in France, Ireland, and Netherlands public investment 
responds positively to changes in private investment. Finally, public investment 
responds significantly to changes in output in the cases of France, Germany, and 
Netherlands. The endogeneity of public investment in these cases can be understood as 
reflecting the use of public investment as a countercyclical tool reacting to changes in 
the private sector variables as well as the fact that financing public investment is easier 
when the tax base is expanding. In any case, the important point is that for eight of the 
twelve countries public investment is not an exogenous variable.   
 
8 See, for example Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), 
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Table 5.    Policy Functions for Public Investment 
  constant trend  Δig(-1)  Δip(-1)  Δl(-1)  Δy(-1) 
Austria 
-0.0066 -  0.0121 -0.2442  2.0533  -1.2599 
(-0.1108)   (0.0478)  (-0.3215)  (0.4274)  (-0.4472) 
Belgium 
0.0209 -  0.2377 0.2635  0.1162  -2.5449 
(0.3782)   (0.9014)  (0.4682)  (0.0379)  (-0.8859) 
Finland 
0.0154 - -0.5156  -0.2485  2.7997  0.3343 
(0.4468)   (-2.0519)** (-0.5312)  (1.6790)*  (0.2459) 
France 
0.1192 -0.0037  0.0817  0.9188  3.3286 -4.2032 
(2.2166)** (-1.4086) (0.3155)  (1.9840)*  (1.2238) (-2.1101)** 
Germany 
-0.0656 -  0.1088 -0.1129  0.1216  2.4901 
(-2.3212)**   (0.4697) (-0.2069)  (0.4793)  (1.5589) 
Greece 
0.0778 -  0.0513 0.2539  -3.3502  -1.1904 
(2.1611)**   (0.2055) (0.6979)  (-2.0061)**  (-0.7819) 
Ireland 
-0.2216 -0.0121  0.8116  0.8835  -1.3060 0.2687 
(-0.0241) (-0.2196) (4.0717)** (2.4059)**  (-0.7208) (0.1726) 
Italy 
- -  -0.3881  1.3534  0.1764  -1.4590 
   (-1.5572)  (1.8295)*  (0.0778)  (-1.0625) 
Luxembourg 
-0.0314 -  0.1083 0.4034  4.5012  -0.1335 
(-0.8854)   (0.5836)  (2.0650)**  (2.0482)**  (-0.1733) 
Netherlands 
-0.0313 -  -0.0433  -0.1636  -0.2023  2.5350 
(-1.1855)   (-0.1684)  (-0.3923)  (-0.3077)  (1.7347)* 
Portugal 
- -  0.0070  0.4614  2.1096  -0.6718 
   (0.0327)  (1.3500)  (1.3569)  (-0.6128) 
Spain 
-0.0345 -0.0053  -0.0115  -0.8925  -2.3049 7.8235 
(-0.2727) (-1.0218) (-0.0459)  (-0.9394)  (-0.6092) (1.5454) 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. * significant at 10% level and ** at 5% level. 
 
 
3.2.    Measuring the Effects of Innovations in the Public Investment Variables 
 
We consider the effects of one-time one-percentage point innovations in the rates of 
growth of public investment. We expect these innovations to have temporary effects on 
the growth rates of the other variables which by definition will translate into permanent 
effects on the levels of these variables.   
The long-term elasticities of the different variables with respect to public investment 
as well as the corresponding ranges of variation are reported in Table 6. Long-term is 
defined as the time horizon over which the growth effects of innovations disappear, i.e., 
the accumulated impulse-response functions converge. These elasticities represent 
long-term accumulated percentage point changes per one percentage point long-term 
accumulated change in public investment.   
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Table 6.    Long-term Accumulated Elasticities with Respect to Public Investment 
  output  employment  private investment 
Austria 
central case  0.005  -0.018  -0.008 
range of variation  [-0.024;0.031] [-0.040;0.009]  [-0.085;0.117] 
Belgium 
central case  0.003  -0.004  -0.254 
range of variation  [-0.004;0.044] [-0.007;0.022]  [-0.281;-0.003] 
Finland 
central case  0.049  0.047  0.263 
range of variation  [-0.194;0.056] [-0.251;0.056]  [-0.534;0.293] 
France 
central case  0.111  0.057  0.271 
range of variation  [-0.001;0.111] [-0.019;0.057]  [-0.127;0.271] 
Germany 
central case  0.133  0.355  0.252 
range of variation  [-0.072;0.133] [-0.193;0.355]  [-0.193;0.252] 
Greece 
central case  0.151  -0.002  0.181 
range of variation  [-0.070;0.151] [-0.002;0.004]  [-0.522;0.181] 
Ireland 
central case  0.109  0.137  0.151 
range of variation  [-0.027;0.109] [0.040;0.137]  [-0.216;0.151] 
Italy 
central case  0.197  0.148  0.095 
range of variation  [-0.473;0.339] [-0.076;0.159]  [-0.551;0.355] 
Luxembourg 
central case  -0.023  -0.153  -0.123 
range of variation  [-0.193;0.107] [-0.223;-0.028]  [-0.901;0.143] 
Netherlands 
central case  -0.197  -0.331  -0.773 
range of variation  [-0.197;0.009] [-0.331;0.038]  [-0.773;-0.136] 
Portugal 
central case  0.125  0.059  0.776 
range of variation  [-0.479;0.125] [-0.174;0.059]  [-0.155;0.776] 
Spain 
central case  0.071  0.110  0.150 
range of variation  [0.024;0.096] [0.048;0.142]  [-0.030;0.318] 
 
 
In Tables 7 and 8 we report marginal product figures. These figures measure the 
change in million euros in output and private investment and the number of jobs created 
per one million euros in accumulated change in public investment. We obtain the 
marginal products by multiplying the average ratio of the private sector variable to 
public investment for the last ten years, by the corresponding elasticity. The choice of 
average ratio for the last ten years is designed to reflect the relative scarcity of public 
investment without letting these ratios be overly affected by business cycle factors. In 
turn, rates of return are calculated from the marginal product figures by assuming a life 
horizon of twenty years for public capital assets. These are the rates which, if applied to 
one euro over a twenty-year period, yield the value of the marginal products. They are 
adjusted to accommodate a linear depreciation rate of 5%, which is implicit in the life 
horizon of twenty years.   
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4.    ON THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF PUBLIC 
INVESTMENT 
 
4.1.    On the Economic Effects of Public Investment 
 
Estimation results reported in Table 7 suggest that public investment has a positive 
effect on both employment and private investment in most countries. Public investment 
crowds out employment in the long term in Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
Netherlands and very marginally in Greece. For the remaining countries the long-term 
elasticities of employment with respect to public investment range from 0.047 for 
Finland to 0.148 for Italy. In terms of job creation the countries that seem to benefit the 
most are Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and, in particular, Germany. In general, however, 
both the elasticities and the marginal products tend to be small. This is consistent with 
the view that in the long-term employment is mostly determined by exogenous labor 
supply conditions. 
We find that public investment crowds out private investment again in the cases of 
Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands. For the remaining countries we find 
positive effects with long-term elasticities ranging from 0.095 in the case of Italy to 0.776 
in the case of Portugal. The largest complementarity effects between public and private 
investment can be found in Finland, France, Germany, and, in particular, Portugal. This 
is an important result in that the issue of whether public investment crowds out or 
crowds in private investment is important in itself. Our finding of crowding in for most 
countries suggests that cut in public investment in these countries will affect output 
negatively in the long-term. If for no other reason, this is so because cuts in public 
investment will reduce private capital accumulation and thereby long-term output.     
Finally, estimation results reported in Table 8 suggest that public investment has 
positive and important effects on output for most countries. Luxembourg and 
Netherlands show a negative long-term elasticity while Austria and Belgium show 
negligible positive elasticities. It is important to note that these are the only countries 
where we estimate that public investment crowds out both employment and private 
investment. This shows that for these countries any positive scale effects of public 
investment on output are neutralized by the negative substitution effects on the other 
inputs. For the remaining eight countries the long-term elasticities of output with respect 
to public investment range from 0.049 in Finland to 0.197 in Italy. The largest marginal 
products are estimated for Germany, and Italy, with rates of return in excess of 10% and 
to a lesser degree for France, Ireland, and Portugal, with rates of return on the 6% to 7% 
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Table 7.    Long-term Effects on Employment and Private Investment 
 
Employment Private  Investment 
Elasticity  Number of Jobs Elasticity  Marginal Productivity 
Austria -0.018  -21 -0.008  -0.094 
Belgium -0.004  -3  -0.254  -2.723 
Finland 0.047  30  0.263  1.480 
France 0.057  32 0.271  1.377 
Germany 0.355 367  0.252  2.531 
Greece -0.002 -2  0.181  0.932 
Ireland 0.137  84 0.151  0.989 
Italy 0.148  129  0.095  0.689 
Luxembourg -0.153  -33  -0.123  -0.466 
Netherlands -0.331  -219  -0.773  -4.594 
Portugal 0.059 68  0.776  4.354 
Spain 0.110  81  0.150  0.933 
 
 
Table 8.    Long-term Effects on Output 
  Elasticity  Marginal Productivity  Rate of Return 
Austria 0.005 0.277  -6.2 
Belgium 0.003  0.192  -7.9 
Finland 0.049 1.700  2.7 
France 0.111  3.627  6.7 
Germany 0.133  7.013  10.3 
Greece 0.151  4.307  7.6 
Ireland 0.109  3.727  6.8 
Italy 0.197  8.631  11.4 
Luxembourg -0.023  -0.514  - 
Netherlands -0.197  -6.549  - 
Portugal 0.125  3.235  6.0 
Spain 0.071  2.096  3.8 
 
 
From the standpoint of the central motivation of this paper, our results imply that in 
the cases of Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Netherlands cuts in public investment 
would be relatively harmless for the economy in the long-term. This is good news for all 
of these countries in that they all face moderate public deficits and all have implemented 
over the last decade or have contemplated to implement in the near future cuts in public 
investment as a share of GDP. On the other hand, our results are clearly bad news for the 
remaining countries. In particular, for Germany, Greece, France, Italy and Portugal, 
where public deficits are high and persistent and the temptation to cut public investment 
is the strongest. Indeed, in Germany, Greece, and Portugal a clear reduction in public PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE  15
investment has already happened in the last few years and/or is scheduled to continue for 
a few more years. Our results suggest that these cuts will have harmful effects on the 
long-term economic performance of these countries. Finally, for Finland, Ireland, and 
Spain, the current budgetary situation is comfortable and no cuts in public investment 
have happened or are currently projected for the near future. In fact, in the cases of 
Ireland and Spain public investment has been and is projected to continue to increase as 
a share of the GDP. For these countries, the success of budgetary consolidation is 
opening the doors to public investments that will help long-term economic performance. 
 
4.3.    On the Budgetary Impact of Public Investment 
 
Having established which countries seem to benefit the most from public investment 
and conversely which ones would lose the most from cuts in public investments we now 
turn to the potential long-term budgetary impact of these investments. To understand the 
issue we need to recognize that a positive effect of public investment on output in the 
long term also means an increased tax base and, therefore, increased tax revenues in the 
long term. It is, therefore, conceivable that over time public investment has such strong 
effects on output that it generates enough additional tax revenues to pay for itself. It is 
equally plausible that the effects on output although positive are not strong enough for 
public investment to pay for itself.  In the first case, cuts in current public investment 
not only hurt long-term growth but also make the future budgetary situation worse. In 
the second case, such cuts hurt long-term output prospects but help the budgetary 
situation in the long-term. 
To measure the potential revenue effects of the public investments in each country, 
we consider from the Statistical Annex of the European Economy (2006), the average 
effective tax rate on output, the sum of direct and indirect tax revenue as a percentage of 
GDP, for the period 1994 to 2003. We exclude from the effective tax rate computations 
actual social contributions and miscellaneous revenues. Also, we consider this ten-year 
period to capture the economic conditions at the end of the sample period while at the 
same time avoiding business cycle effects. The average effective tax rates are reported in 
the second column of Table 9 while the revenue effects of public investment are 
reported on the third column. 
Our empirical results have clear taxonomic implications in that the euro countries 
can be gathered in four groups. In the first group are Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
and Netherlands, countries in which public investment does not seem to have positive 
economic effects and, therefore, does not seem to generate any significant tax revenue 
effects. For this group, cuts in public investment are not harmful for the economy and 
are clearly helpful from a budgetary perspective. In the second group are Finland, 
Portugal, and Spain, countries in which public investment has positive effects in the 
economy but does not pay for itself. For these countries cuts in public investment are 
harmful for the economy but have positive long-term budgetary effects. In the third 
group are France, Greece, and Ireland, countries for which public investment seems to 
exactly pay for itself. For these countries, cuts in public investment are harmful for the   ALFREDO MARVAO PEREIRA AND MARIA DE FATIMA PINHO  16









Austria 0.277  0.268  -  0.074 
Belgium 0.193 0.299  -  0.058 
Finland 1.700  0.328  0.588  0.558 
France 3.627  0.247  0.276  0.894 
Greece 4.307  0.231  0.232  0.995 
Germany 7.322  0.230 0.137 1.650 
Ireland 3.727  0.289  0.268  1.078 
Italy 8.631  0.286  0.116  2.469 
Luxembourg -0.514  0.295  -  - 
Netherlands -6.549  0.234  -  - 
Portugal 3.235 0.229 0.309 0.740 
Spain 2.096  0.212  0.477  0.445 
 
 
economy and neutral from a long-term budgetary perspective. In the fourth group are 
Germany and Italy, countries for which public investment seems to more that pay for 
itself. For these countries, the strategy of using cuts in public investment as an 
instrument to achieve budgetary consolidation is harmful for the economy and 
counterproductive from a budgetary perspective. 
Applying these findings to the current budgetary situation we conclude that the 
countries facing serious budgetary situations, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, and 
Portugal, seem to be in different regimes as far as the economic and budgetary effects of 
cuts in public investment. In the case of Portugal, the strategy of using public investment 
cuts is harmful from an economic perspective but will be effective in terms of budgetary 
consolidation. In the cases of France and Greece, cuts in public investment will be 
harmful from an economic perspective and will do little in helping the long term 
budgetary situation. Finally, in the cases of Germany and Italy, cuts in public investment 
will be harmful from an economic perspective and will actually hinder long-term 
budgetary  prospects.   
As a final point, in the cases of France, Germany, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, one 
should not ignore the fact that effective tax rates are about the lowest among the 
different countries. This is important because any efforts to reduce tax evasion and/or 
tax avoidance or any other marginal changes in the tax codes may increase these rates in 
an important manner. To have an idea of how high the effective tax rates would have to 
be for public investment to pay for itself, we calculate the equilibrium effective tax rate 
for the different countries, which are also reported in Table 9. Our calculations suggest 
that such changes in tax collection are not likely to substantially affect our conclusions 
in that they do not seem to be within reach for any of the countries in question in the 
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5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper we address a question of the utmost importance in the context of 
budgetary policy in the euro area, namely, the long-term economic and budgetary effects 
of public investment. The impact of public investment on output is important in itself 
from a long-term growth perspective. It is also important from a long-term budgetary 
perspective. This is because a positive impact on output also represents a positive impact 
on the tax base and therefore, leads to the critical empirical question of whether or not 
public investment pays for itself in the form of future tax revenues. If it does, then 
current cuts in public investment spending not only jeopardize long-term growth but also 
make the long-term budgetary situation more difficult. If not, then only the negative 
long-term growth effects remain but public investment cuts do help the budgetary 
situation in the long-term. 
In this paper we find that public investment has strong positive effect on long-term 
output for eight of the twelve euro area countries. We also find that public investment 
crowds in both employment and private investment for the same eight countries, 
although the long-term effects on employment tend to be small. The exceptions to these 
patterns are Luxembourg and Netherlands where the output effects are negative, and 
Austria and Belgium where the output effects are positive but very small. These four 
countries are also the only cases where we find negative long-terms effects on both 
employment and private investment, thereby, establishing the relevance of these indirect 
effects of public investment. As a general statement and despite the obvious differences 
in scope, methodology, and specifics our results have the same flavor as the results for 
22 OECD countries presented in Kamps (2005). From the perspective of the focus of 
this paper, the conclusion is that for most countries in the euro area cuts in public 
investment come with a price in terms of long-term economic performance.       
The picture in terms of the potential budgetary impact of public investment is more 
diverse. We find, that for Finland, Portugal, and Spain, public investment does not pay 
for itself and, therefore, cuts are an effective tool of budgetary consolidation. For France, 
Greece, Ireland, however, public investment just pays for itself and therefore cuts are not 
an effective way of achieving long-term budgetary consolidation. Finally, for Germany 
and Italy, public investment more than pays for itself and, therefore, cuts are not only 
ineffective in achieving long-term budgetary consolidation they are actually 
counterproductive.   
Considering the current budgetary difficulties in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and 
Portugal it would seem that among these countries cuts in public investment would only 
be helpful from a budgetary perspective in Portugal. For the other countries this strategy 
would be either ineffective or counter-productive from a budgetary perspective. In all 
cases it would be harmful from an economic perspective.     
Although our results are informative in terms of the current budgetary situation their 
applicability is much more general. In fact, a lot of the success of the fiscal consolidation 
in the 1990s was attributable to an increase in the revenue to GDP ratio, a pattern that ALFREDO MARVAO PEREIRA AND MARIA DE FATIMA PINHO  18
has been reversed in recent years. Furthermore, and partly due to budgetary 
consolidation fatigue, after 1999 primary expenditures in the euro area have increased by 
more than 1% of the GDP. These facts, together with the persistently poor economic 
performance in the euro area in recent years make it likely that other countries will 
experience similar budgetary problems in the near future.   
More importantly, our results have broader implications well beyond the current or 
future budgetary problems faced by certain euro area countries and how they will impact 
public investment. Indeed, as argued before, the very fiscal rules of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact have the potential to reduce public investment. 
This is because of the bias towards current expenditure under tax-financing of public 
spending. Our results suggest that to the extent that the fiscal rules themselves, 
independently of the specific budgetary situation, lead to a reduction of public 
investment, then most euro area countries will be negatively affected in terms of the 
long-term growth and employment performance.       
Finally, it should be pointed out that our conclusions as to the potential budgetary 
impact of public investment are much richer than suggested by previous literature. 
Perroti (2004), for example, in the context of 5 highly developed OECD countries - 
Australia, Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, and United States, finds little evidence 
that public investment ever pays for itself. In fact only in the case of Germany and in the 
short term is public investment self-amortizing. Our results suggest that for Germany 
and Italy public investment more than pays for itself while for France, Greece, Ireland, it 
marginally pays for itself. Our results, therefore, although they do not corroborate the 
main message of that paper, do tend to corroborate the conjecture in that paper that its 
results may be less applicable to countries with lower GDP and/or public capital per 
capita.  
The variety of results we obtain across countries as to the economic and budgetary 
effects of public investment establishes the need to investigate this issue at a much wider 
international level. More importantly, the finding that in many countries there are 
negative long-term budgetary effects of cuts in public investment opens the door to the 
question of identifying the best instruments for fiscal consolidation in each country, both 
in terms of their economic impact and in terms of their effectiveness in actually leading 
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